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El-Fateh Children’s Hospital case has proven to be 
more enigmatic than most of us predicted when it 
first came to surface. The social and legal 
implications of this case have clouded the scientific 
thinking process of many. In our opinion, as 
scientists we should look for the truth no matter what 
its’ outcome. Politicizing a scientific matter always 
leads to a dangerous abyss. The only way to do so 
is to try to comprehend what exactly happened 
based on scientific evidence regardless of who did it 
and why! 
Currently, there are two opposing points of view. 
On one side stands some of the greatest Western 
AIDS experts, and on the other side is the Libyan 
National Experts Committee, composed of well-
regarded authorities in the field of HIV-1/AIDS. There 
have been numerous reports published in well 
respected Scientific and non-scientific journals that 
appear to mostly represent the Western points of 
view. We attempted to rebut an article that appeared 
in the New England Journal of Medicine but were 
immediately turned down [1].  
The Western scholars considered the tragedy the 
result of massive nosocomial infection due to poor 
infection control measures. Their conclusion was 
based on several facts, including the presence of 
HCV infection in some of the children infected with 
HIV-1, indicating the breakdown of the infection 
control system. The HIV-1 strain responsible for this 
nosocomial infection belongs to the subtype AlG, a 
recombinant form of virus frequent in Central and 
West Africa but nevertheless, a very unique HIV-1 
strain. All samples sequenced from these children 
belong to a single and monophyletic HIV-1 strain 
never seen or reported previously in the HIV-1 
database. Of note, the children were not infected by 
vertical transmission making the argument strongly 
in favor of nosocomial infection [2-4]. Western 
scholars are also puzzled by the unusual 
transmission rate of this outbreak.  
Although all of the above arguments are based on 
facts, it can carry a different interpretation. There are 
three very important arguments that need to be 
addressed. First is the use of HCV to booster the 
scientific argument of nosocomial infection [1-4]. 
This logic would be successful in a normal situation, 
but in the Libyan outbreak this appears to be an 
unsound reasoning. HCV found in these children 
may have infected them by vertical transmission. 
HCV is a relatively common infection in Libya as well 
as in many parts of Africa. The four related 
genotypes of HCV reported in these children are 
also the same that are common in this part of North 
Africa [2-3]. In addition, vertical transmission of 
HCV is well established [5]. Second, it is already 
established that the mothers of these children 
were HIV-1 seronegative and the HIV-1 infection 
did not come to these children via vertical 
transmission [2-3]. Therefore, mixing these two 
viruses that have entirely different pathogeneses 
is scientifically unsound [5]. The third point relates 
to the uniqueness of the HIV-1 strain that was 
found in the infected children [2-4]. All three 
scientific data revealed that the Libyan outbreak 
was due to the monophyletic HIV-1 [2-4]. It is a 
unique sequence that did not exist previously 
[CRF02-AG: 2-4]. Some investigators have 
hypothesized the possibility of infection originating 
from the thousands of sub-Saharan immigrants to 
Benghazi [1-4]. If we take this hypothesis at its 
face value then it does not explain the 
monophyletic nature of the HIV-1. In sub-Sahara 
Africa, there are at least several hundred strains of 
HIV-1 [M, N, and O groups and subtypes: 6-7] and 
most likely several hundred thousand quasi-
species of HIV-1 [8]. If a few infected individuals 
started the “outbreak” then it does not explain the 
monophyletic nature of this unique genetic virus. 
In the scientific literature the “monophyletic” 
lentivirus is found in experimental innoculation of 
“cloned” HIV-1 or SIVs utilized for vaccine trials in 
primates [9-10)]. Finding such a virus in human 
outbreak is unheard of and is very alarming. 
Furthermore, even in the experimental primates 
utilized for AIDS research, if more than one 
genetically closely related strain are used for 
vaccination, they develop a series of new 
recombinant quasi-strains, discrediting the 
argument of HIV-1 that initiated the outbreak 
originated from the immigrants [11].  
The Libyan National Experts Committee refuted 
the Western reports, stating the assumption of a 
nosocomial infection lacked epidemiological 
evidence and scientific proof [12]. The incident 
was localized to a single hospital (El-Fateh 
Children’s Hospital) and not observed in any of the 
other hospitals in the city of Benghazi. 
The final report by the Libyan National Experts 
Committee raised several valid questions, 
considered by the Western media and some 
scholars as generalities. However these 
generalities represent the core of the problem. 
Lack of basic hygiene and infection control 
measures in hospitals is still a major problem in 
most of the developing countries. Libya is just one 
country in a long list of developing countries with 
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infection control problems. El-Fateh hospital is one 
of several government hospitals in Benghazi. 
Keeping this in mind compels us to question why 
similar incidents never happened before. The theory 
that a single patient started this epidemic 
somewhere in 1994-97 suggests a very unrealistic 
and unreported rate of HIV-1 transmission [2-4]. If 
such a rate was achievable by any strain of HIV-1, 
then that strain would have been widely spread all 
over the region. Moreover, similar incidents would 
have occurred in several developing countries in the 
region with poor infection control measures. What 
makes El-Fateh hospital such an unusual place to 
have this alleged high transmission rate of a unique 
and monophyletic HIV-1 strain, in contrast to all the 
other hospitals in the same city? In addition, the high 
rate of transmission blamed on nosocomial infection 
has serious flaws. For example, if one takes the 
CDC guidelines that are accepted worldwide that 
there is a 0.3% infection rate by so-called unhygienic 
conditions then one must have injected several 
thousand children with the contaminated needles [5]. 
One needs to realize that if one injects an uninfected 
child with a needle that was used recently for a 
infected child and then dipped it in hot water (that is 
a common practice in many developing nations), the 
infection rate from that particular needle would be 
between 0.3%-0.009%, (3 in 1000 to 9 in 100,000) 
according to the CDC guidelines [5] (of note, 0.3% 
risk is for health care workers who were accidentally 
stabbed with a contaminated needle that was just 
used for an HIV-1-infected patient, and these 
individuals have to incur a deep subcutaneous 
wound with that particular needle without dipping in 
hot water; [5]. However, in the case of Libyan 
children the dirty needles were not reused at all [12]. 
Supposing we consider the Western scientists’ 
argument and take these rates at face value, then 
one has to infect between 200,000 to several 
hundred million children with contaminated needles. 
Obviously, the numbers do not add up! These 
numbers exceed the number of children, not only in 
Benghazi, but in the whole country of Libya. 
Finally, we would like to point out a major scientific 
flaw in the calculation of the timeline for this 
particular strain of HIV-1 [2-4]. All three studies have 
utilized some version of the Bayesian method to 
determine when this particular strain of HIV-1 came 
about in these infected children. The genetic 
phylogenic method which they have utilized is based 
on relatively sound mathematical analysis tools [2-4], 
and had been used to calculate the timeline of 
genetically stable proteins and nucleic acids. 
Unfortunately, in the case of HIV-1 such analytical 
tools are less reliable and in certain cases become 
useless. For example, all these authors assumed 
that in the case of HIV-1 molecular change is a linear 
function of time and that base substitutions 
accumulate according to a Poisson distribution. 
[13]. However, the genetic analyses completed by 
both of these groups are based on false 
assumptions. These investigators appeared to 
have ignored the most basic characteristics of 
retroviruses [8,11]. As compared to other viruses 
or genes, retroviruses have an amazing ability to 
rapidly form new recombinant viruses and the 
Libyan HIV-1 strain is a recombinant virus itself [2-
4]. Utilization of Bayesian algorithm in the case of 
retroviruses has been challenged on mathematical 
grounds by Schierup and Hein [14]. Therefore, we 
argue that recombination is the simplest 
explanation for the lack of a molecular timeline in 
many data sets of viruses. For example, the 
recombination rate for HIV-1 is likely to be higher 
than even the largest value used in the published 
studies on the Libyan HIV case [2-4], making the 
timeline estimates invalid or at least inaccurate 
[13-14]. Thus, dating the origin of the HIV-1 in this 
outbreak from early sequences may yield 
misleading results [14]. 
It is important to note also that the Libyan 
committee failed to give any proof that the 
outbreak was the result of an act of bioterrorism, 
and instead concluded that data available did not 
contradict the possibility of a deliberate 
transmission of HIV-1 to the infected children. 
Scientifically, one can state that in light of the 
glaring evidence of a monophyletic HIV-1 strain 
that has never been reported previously, and an 
unlikely scenario that such a high transmission 
rate was the result of the incompetence of the 
infection control unit at El-Fateh hospital, one 
suspect that some sort of malpractice has taken 
place. However, we as the outsiders cannot make 
this judgment. Like in any sovereign nation, this 
has to be decided by the judiciary arm of the 
Libyan government. 
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